United States Air Force controllers at Yokota Air Base situated near the flight path of Flight 123 had been monitoring the aircraft that is distressed calls for help. They maintained contact for the ordeal with Japanese flight control officials and made their landing strip offered to the aeroplane. The Atsugi Naval Base also cleared their runway for JAL 123 after being alerted for the ordeal. After losing track on radar, a U.S. Air Force C-130 from the 345th TAS was asked to search for the missing plane. The C-130 crew was the first ever to spot the crash site 20 minutes after impact, although it was still daylight. The crew sent the positioning to Japanese authorities and Yokota that is radioed Air to alert them and directed a Huey helicopter from Yokota into the crash site. Rescue teams were assembled in preparation to reduce Marines down for rescues by helicopter tow line. Despite American offers of assistance in locating and recovering the crashed plane, an order arrived, saying that U.S. personnel were to stand down and announcing that the Japan Self-Defense Forces were planning to care for it themselves and outside help was not necessary. Even today, it is unclear who issued the order denying U.S. forces permission to begin with search and rescue missions.Although a JSDF helicopter eventually spotted the wreck during the night time, poor visibility together with difficult mountainous terrain prevented it from landing at the site. The pilot reported through the fresh air that there were no signs of survivors. Centered on this report, JSDF personnel on the ground did not set out to your website the of the crash night. Instead, these people were dispatched to pay the night at a village that is makeshift tents, constructing helicopter landing ramps and participating in other preparations, all 63 kilometers (39.1 miles) from the wreck. Rescue teams did not put down for the crash site before the morning that is following. Medical staff later found bodies with injuries suggesting that individuals had survived the crash simply to die from shock, exposure overnight in the mountains, or from injuries that, if had a tendency to earlier, wouldn’t normally have been fatal.
Japan’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission officially determined that the decompression that is rapid due to a faulty repair after a tailstrike incident during a landing at Osaka Airport seven years earlier. A doubler plate on the bulkhead that is rear of plane was improperly repaired, compromising the plane’s airworthiness. Cabin pressurization continued to enhance and contract the improperly repaired bulkhead until the day associated with the accident, when the faulty repair finally failed, causing the decompression that is rapid ripped off a large portion of the tail and caused the increased loss of hydraulic controls to the entire plane.Japan’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission officially concluded that the rapid decompression was brought on by a faulty repair after a tailstrike incident during a landing at Osaka Airport seven years earlier. A doubler plate from the rear bulkhead regarding the plane was improperly repaired, compromising the plane’s airworthiness. Cabin pressurization continued to enhance and contract the improperly repaired bulkhead until the day regarding the accident, once the faulty repair finally failed, causing the decompression that is rapid ripped off a large part of the tail and caused the loss of hydraulic controls to the entire
The National Transportation Safety Board issued the following recommendation to the FAA on January 28, 1982:Evaluate any procedures approved to pay for essay repair Boeing 747 and Boeing 767 aft pressure bulkheads to assure that the repairs do not affect the “fail-safe” concept of the bulkhead design, which is intended to limit the area of pressure relief in the event of a structural failure.Revise the inspection program for the Boeing 747 rear pressure bulkhead to establish an inspection interval wherein inspections beyond the routine visual inspection would be performed to detect the extent of possible multiple site fatigue cracking.Fatigue testing and damage tolerance testing were completed on the Boeing 747 in March and July, 1986, respectively as a result of this accident and several others involving operations in snow and icing conditions. A reinforced aft pressure bulkhead was installed from line number 672, delivered in February 1987.Detailed inspection by high-precision eddy current, ultrasonic wave, and x-rays be accomplished at 2,000 flight-cycle intervals (freighters) or at 4,000 flight-cycle intervals for passenger airplanes.Evaluate any procedures approved to repair the aft pressure bulkhead of any airplanes which incorporate a dome-type of design to make sure that the affected repair does not derogate the fail-safe idea of the bulkhead. AD 85-22-12 was issued to address this recommendation.Issue a maintenance alert bulletin to persons responsible for the engineering approval of repairs to emphasize that the approval adequately consider the possibility of impact on ultimate failure modes or other fail-safe design criteria.Require the manufacturer to modify the design associated with Boeing 747 empennage and hydraulic systems to ensure that in the event that a substantial pressure buildup occurs into the normally unpressurized empennage, the structural integrity of this stabilizers.